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Abstract 
When China acceded to WTO in 2001, there were fears that Chinese firms would lose market 
share in key sectors to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).  Although aggregate data often 
indicate a shift in favour of FIEs, indigenous firms in many cases have slowly increased market 
share and deepened their technical capabilities.  Through an analysis of aggregate industry-level 
data and interview data from both OEM and key supply firms in three sectors, we show how the 
dynamics of competition between Chinese and FIEs in China’s domestic market enhance the 
upgrading prospects for Chinese firms.  China represents a new development model in which 
industrial upgrading efforts are domestically-driven and globally integrated and intensely 
competitive. 
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During the first two decades of the reform period, China’s central government 
struggled to tilt the terms of competition within the domestic marketplace in favour of 
indigenous Chinese firms.  High tariff barriers shielded the market from global competition; 
foreign firms that sought access to the domestic market were pushed to transfer technology to 
Chinese partners; strict domestic content requirements were the norm in many sectors.  China’s 
leaders were impressed with the developmental success of their neighbours to the East, and a 
dominant lesson of the East Asian “model” of development was that government should play a 
role in creating the space for domestic firms to grow and develop the capabilities needed to 
compete globally.   
When China finally acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, there 
was a widespread fear that liberalization was happening too quickly.  Chinese firms were not 
yet prepared for the rigours of global competition and the critics of the accession agreement 
feared that as tariff barriers fell, domestic Chinese firms would rapidly lose market share to 
their global competitors.  Although aggregate data on the relative market shares of domestic 
and foreign firms often indicate a shift in favor of the latter, the worst of the initial fears were 
not realized.  Following entry into WTO, market competition increased dramatically in China, 
but instead of losing market share to foreign firms, indigenous firms in many sectors have 
increased market share and, in some cases, deepened their technological capabilities in the 
course of making the transition into higher-value added parts of the value chain.  The purpose 
of this paper is to provide evidence of this success and to offer an explanation for it. 
How can we explain the capacity of Chinese firms (or lack thereof) to upgrade their 
capabilities in certain industrial sectors?  We believe the answer to this question lays in an 
analysis of the competition for the rapidly expanding domestic market in China, and in 
particular, the middle of this market.  Although exports have been critical to China’s growth, an 
important dimension of the competition and the upgrading process lies in the interaction 
between domestic and foreign invested firms that are largely competing in China’s domestic 
market, a market that for some key sectors has grown three to four folds in the last decade.  The 
huge size of this market has provided ample room for entry and expansion in many sectors 
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without the need to go outside, as was often the case for Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese 
firms.  Within this market, intense competition—a product of lower tariff barriers and an 
increase in imports and entry by both foreign-invested and domestic firms—has raised the 
threshold level of capability that firms must achieve in order to survive.   
China represents a new development model in that industrial upgrading efforts are 
domestically-driven and globally integrated and intensely competitive. This combination of a 
domestic-market focus and intense competition offers a new set of opportunities and constraints 
for firms that are struggling to upgrade their capabilities.   
In this paper we analyze the dynamics of competition in three key industrial sectors in 
China:  automotive, heavy construction, and machine tools.  The same trend is present in each 
of these sectors.  At the low-end of the market, which is dominated by Chinese firms, 
consumers are largely indifferent to quality and firms compete on the basis of price.  At the 
high end of the market, where quality is critical and consumers are less sensitive to price, 
imports and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) dominate. The level of competition in each of 
these sectors has been increasing, but domestic and foreign firms often compete in different 
segments of these markets. Moreover, significant barriers to entry inhibit each from easily 
encroaching on the share of the other.  Foreign firms are rarely able to meet the price points 
demanded by consumers in the low-end of the market, allowing domestic firms the benefit of 
being insulated from foreign competitors.  Analogously, indigenous Chinese firms rarely have 
the deep knowhow to design, manufacture and market products to compete with foreign firms 
in the high-end.    
Neither the domestic nor the foreign firms are content to remain in their respective 
segment, however.  For the domestic firms, the competition at the low-end is intense:  low 
technical barriers to entry and the wide availability of designs have exposed these firms to 
heavy entry from below, primarily by non-state firms the last decade.  Firms struggle to 
upgrade their technical and manufacturing capabilities so that they can escape the intense 
competition and low profit margins at the bottom.  Success is influenced by many factors, but 
among the most important are the resources inherited from the planned economy and the ability 
to take advantage of the benefits of incorporation in the global economy (i.e.  human capital, 
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supply relationships, etc.).  For the foreign firms, rapid growth in the size of the mid-range 
market in China provides a powerful lure, particularly in sectors where growth in global 
markets is slow or stagnant.  Success is influenced by their ability to adapt their products for the 
domestic market in China, lower costs through increased local sourcing, and more generally, 
their ability to adjust their operations so as to be able to achieve the price-level demanded by 
this market.   
The result is the fight for the middle:  domestic firms strive to upgrade their product 
through improvement in design and manufacturing methods in order to escape the intense 
competition at the bottom while foreign firms seek to decrease costs in order to capture the 
rapidly growing market segments in the middle.  The cost-cutting efforts of foreign firms lead 
them to localize their operations more aggressively than would otherwise be the case, and this 
provides a new range of upgrading opportunities for Chinese firms.  
In the first section of the paper we consider two of the dominant approaches to 
industrial upgrading in East Asia.  This review is not meant to be exhaustive, but is simply 
intended to demonstrate the difficulties these approaches have in explaining what is happening 
in China.  In the second section we analyze the dynamics of competition in the Chinese 
domestic market and explain why a more fine-grained analysis is necessary.  Each subsequent 
section analyzes a particular market segment, namely, the bottom, the top, and the middle. 
 
I.  From Export-Led Growth to Domestic-Led Upgrading 
Exports have been the crucial driver of economic growth in East Asia and the primary 
theoretical frameworks for understanding industrial upgrading have focused on how 
governments and firms prepare for competition in global markets.  
One of the most influential frameworks is that of the developmental state. As 
Alexander Gerschenkron argued in his classic study of late 19th century industrial development 
in Germany, the institutions of the state must assist industries that are technology and capital 
intensive in their efforts to acquire the most advanced technology (1962:  83).  The 
developmental state explanation of rapid growth in East Asia followed closely from 
Gerschenkron’s logic, with Japan (Johnson 1982) and Korea (Amsden 1989) classic examples 
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of “late” development.  Large business groups were granted protection and preferential access 
to capital by the state, which they leveraged in the domestic market to build capabilities, 
diversify into a broad range of industrial capabilities, and prepare for an outward push into 
global markets.  Scale and scope were critical to this model:  they translated into cost savings 
(due to fuller capacity utilization and bulk purchases of inputs), allowed for more learning-by-
doing, and made it possible to spread the fixed cost of design over larger output volumes 
(Amsden and Chu 2003:  7).  The subsequent export-push of national firms was important not 
only because it contributed to higher volumes, but also because export performance provided 
the government a measure by which to evaluate the success of sectoral interventions (World 
Bank 1993:  22-23).  
The developmental state model has had great appeal to Chinese policy-makers, but 
implementing this approach is not without its problems.  Putting aside a recent re-evaluation of 
the earlier developmental state literature (Pempel 1999; Stiglitz and Yusuf 2001), it is not clear 
how easy it would be to adapt a developmental state approach in China.  First, the rules of the 
WTO would make it difficult.  Second, even prior to WTO accession, China was far more open 
than its neighbors were at comparable levels of development.  As Branstetter and Lardy (2008:  
635) point out, high formal tariff barriers to imports were often deceptive because of 
exemptions extended to imports that were required for export-processing or that were tied to 
foreign direct investment (FDI).1  Even more important, and in stark contrast to its neighbors in 
Northeast Asia, is China’s openness to FDI.  Foreign firms investing in China face a variety of 
restrictions and in some sectors they are more severe than others, but the high level of FDI 
means that even when a certain industry benefits from a relatively low level of import 
competition, the domestic firms in the industry might face significant competition from foreign 
firms that are operating in China.  Indeed, some scholars have argued that the system is 
systematically biased in favor of foreign firms (Huang 2003).2   
The high levels of FDI in China point to a larger trend:  the globalization of production. 
Although there is nothing new about international production, the degree of fragmentation 
between firms within a value chains and across national borders has increased as a result of the 
liberalization of trading regimes, reductions in transport and communication costs, and the 
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ability to codify design information in digital form.  One indication of this trend is the growth 
of trade in intermediate goods rather than finished goods.  In the world of a developmental 
state, government and business leaders attempt to use industrial policy to support the 
development of integrated product manufacturers; in a world of global production, “the mosaic 
of specialization and intermediate goods flows that make up distributed production systems and 
global value chains (GVCs) means that domestic capabilities and development cannot easily be 
… linked to domestic sources (Whittaker, Zhu et al. Forthcoming:  11).”  The challenge is to 
control the parts of the value chain that are most profitable and maximize the benefits of 
participating in global production chains. 
A second theoretical approach to industrial upgrading analyzes how participation in 
GVCs facilitates industrial upgrading among exporting firms in a developing economy, and has 
provided crucial insights into how the form of interaction with the global economy shapes the 
range of possibilities for developing countries (Bair 2005:  156).  One of the core hypotheses of 
the value chain literature is that participation in GVCs creates the potential for industrial 
upgrading because knowledge flows through the chain (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002:  1020).  
Scholars take a variety of views on how large the potential for upgrading actually is (Gereffi 
1999; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).3  The assumption in all cases, however, is that global 
markets are the objective, and this assumption skews the playing field to the advantage of 
global firms in either buyer-driven or producer-driven chains.  In a buyer-driven chain, the core 
competencies of lead firms are marketing, sales, and retail.  Firms in developing countries 
understand local markets best, and an export-oriented firm from a developing country is 
naturally going to find it difficult to develop brands for a foreign market.  In a producer-driven 
chain, the core competencies of lead firms are technology and design, and firms from 
developing countries are generally weak in both.  As Steinfeld (2004) has argued, Chinese 
firms are extensively involved in production for overseas markets but they are stuck in 
commodity manufacturing and undifferentiated activities that have low-value added.   
This brings us to the central question of this paper:  what if the primary markets are 
domestic rather than foreign?  Within the value chain literature, there are scholars who have 
emphasized the benefits of focusing on multiple markets and participating in multiple value 
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chains (Bazan and Navas-Aleman,  2004; Navas-Aleman and Bazan, 2005; Lee and Chen, 
2000)  Because the organization of the chains vary widely, each offers different opportunities 
for domestic firms.  A focus on domestic markets leads manufacturing firms to broaden the 
scope of their activities (i.e. functional upgrading) into design, marketing, and branding.  This 
may be because they have a better understanding of home markets than foreign markets, or it 
may be because domestic customers are not as powerful or concentrated as their counterparts in 
global value chains.  Participation in multiple value chains provides the possibility of 
“leveraging competencies”:  different value chains create different possibilities for learning, 
and what is learned in one value chain can be applied in others (Lee and Chen 2000).   
Our focus has similarities with this research, but there are important differences.  The 
most important is the scale of the Chinese market, and the extent to which it becomes a focus 
not only for domestic Chinese firms, but also for multinational firms.  It is not simply that 
Chinese firms are able to focus on the domestic market (in addition to their participation in 
global value chains); it is that foreign firms are doing the same.  If the competitive playing field 
is tilted in favour of multinational firms when the market focus is advanced economies, perhaps 
the playing field tilts back to a level position when the focus is a developing economy.  Both 
the domestic and the foreign firms face their challenges—domestic firms struggle to upgrade 
their product through design and quality improvements in order to escape the intense 
competition at the low-end of the market, and foreign firms struggle to decrease costs (without 
sacrificing quality to the extent that the company brand is damaged) in order to capture the 
rapidly growing market segments in the middle of the market—and the interaction of these two 
dynamics gives rise to a new set of opportunities and challenges for a firm that is seeking to 
upgrade.  The result is quite different from the dynamic described by either the developmental 
state literature or the global value chain literature. 
In the business literature there is a growing awareness of the importance of the Chinese 
domestic market, and the manner in which Chinese firms utilize this market to hone the skills 
that they need to compete with multinational firms.  Gadiesh, Leung, and Vestring (2007), in 
particular, describe the rise of the “good enough” market in China, which is essentially the mid-
market segment, and provide excellent insight into the business strategy of domestic and 
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foreign firms that are competing for this segment in China.  Zeng and Williamson (2007) focus 
on how Chinese companies are able to operate at lower costs than their foreign competitors, and 
how their low-cost advantage allows them to move upmarket.  The purpose of these authors is 
neither to provide a systematic argument about the Chinese economy nor to explain why some 
Chinese sectors (and some firms within these sectors) have a greater potential for upgrading 
than others.  They seek to describe company strategies in a key global market.   
Building on the insights of these works, we seek to provide a comprehensive view of 
market segmentation in China and a deeper understanding of why some domestic firms are 
better positioned to take advantage of it than others.  We use aggregate The analysis combines   
 
II.  China’s Domestic Market:  Rapid Growth, but Who Benefits? 
China’s manufacturing sector has experienced enormous growth since the onset of 
economic reform, growth that has been especially pronounced during the last decade.  There is 
little consensus about what is driving this growth and what types of firms are benefiting.  
Outside observers often focus on the export orientation of China, and include China in the 
category of developing countries that have pursued “export-led” growth.  Within Chinese 
manufacturing, scholars have argued that domestic Chinese firms are stuck in low-value added 
activities (e.g. Steinfeld 2004), and the role of foreign firms has been increasing as the economy 
has liberalized.  Aggregate figures on China’s rapid export growth and the role of FDI and FIEs 
provide some credence to this view.  In this section, we seek to provide evidence that aggregate 
figures often obscure the role that domestic Chinese firms play in Chinese industry and to 
demonstrate how a rapidly growing domestic market has provided new opportunities for 
domestic firm vis-à-vis foreign firms and imports. 
The challenge at the aggregate level is determining the overall size of the domestic 
marketplace in China, the type of firm that is filling the domestic demand (domestic firms, FIEs, 
or imports), and the trend over time. We utilize a combination of firm-level output data and 
trade data to provide estimates at the 4-digit CIC (Chinese Industrial Classification) level of the 
size and growth of the domestic market.4  The domestic market is defined here as total output of 
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all firms producing in China less exports plus imports.  Sales of Chinese firms and FIEs going 
to the domestic market, on the other hand, are their total sales less exports.   
Table 1 provides a summary picture for two census years, 1995 and 2004.  In 1995, the 
total value of sales to the domestic market from all three sources was 4.61 trillion RMB.  
Chinese firms captured more than the two-thirds of domestic demand, with imports and sales of 
FIEs making up the rest.  As a consequence of the rapid economic growth between 1995 and 
2004, the domestic market expanded fourfold to 18.7 trillion, implying an annual rate of growth 
of 15.6 percent.  By 2004, however, Chinese firms had seen their share of the domestic market 
slip from 68.3 to 59 percent. Much of this loss was to FIEs, whose share of the domestic market 
rose by more than fifty percent, from 13.3 percent of output in 1995 to 21.8 percent in 2004.  
The share of imports rose only marginally from 18.4 to 19.1 percent.  This evidence appears to 
support the argument that the Chinese market is gradually being conquered by foreign-invested 
firms.    
 While aggregate figures are useful, they can be misleading for two reasons.  First, they 
obscure enormous heterogeneity among the more than four hundred 4-digit manufacturing 
sectors.  Figure 1 provides histograms for the percentage of the domestic market captured by 
each of the three sources (Chinese firms, foreign firms, and imports) in these sectors in 1995.  
There are sectors in which Chinese firms had almost all of the market, and a few sectors 
primarily served by either imports or FIEs operating in China, but as a general rule, the 
domestic market was served by all three.  As we will explain, imports typically served the 
highest end of the market, followed by FIEs and then Chinese firms serving the bulk of the 
market.  Figure 2 provides the histogram for the change in the market share of domestic firms in 
these sectors between 1995 and 2004.  Overall, domestic Chinese firms lose market share, but 
there are pronounced changes in both directions.   
Our purpose in this paper is not to explain these differences, nevertheless, in Tables 2 
and 3 we provide “representative” examples of sectors in which Chinese firms did either 
especially well or experienced a sharp drop in their market share. In both tables, we sort sectors 
on the basis of the initial share of domestic firms in 1995.  As might be expected, the sectors in 
which Chinese firms did especially well appear to be concentrated among more labor-intensive 
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sectors in which manufacturing requirements may not have been especially high, and China was 
able to take advantage of its comparative advantage in low cost labor.5   These two tables are 
complemented by Table 4, which provides representative examples of sectors on the basis of the 
share of FIEs in 2004.    Again, the results are not unexpected.  Foreign firms are gaining 
market share in the types of sectors that we would expect, those in which IPR, manufacturing 
know-how, design, and/or marketing are important. 
 A focus on heterogeneity between sectors is useful, but even this is not fine-grained 
enough.  A second level of detail that is necessary is heterogeneity within sectors.  Even in 
sectors in which Chinese firms have seen their overall market share decline, Chinese firms may 
still be having success in a small but possibly rising number of market segments that may 
portend well for the future.  This can only be revealed by a much more in-depth examination of 
such sectors that carefully dissects market segments within these sectors.   
We roughly follow Gadiesh et al. (2007:  83) in defining market segments within a 
sector according to the quality, sophistication, and price-range that is demanded by consumers.  
At the low-end of the market, consumers are relatively indifferent to quality, the product meets 
relatively basic needs with minimal differentiation between competing products, and price is the 
primary purchasing criteria.  The middle of the market is focused on value for money:  
consumers are seeking a good quality product but they will also demand a reasonable price.  At 
the high end of the market, consumers with far more purchasing power demand a high quality 
product that may be more sophisticated in the range of functions that it performs as well as more 
highly differentiated with competing products.  The manufacturing requirements within these 
segments of an industry can vary as widely as the requirements between sectors.   
The most straight-forward means of distinguishing between segments within a sector is 
to look at product price, since the price will reflect a broad range of product characteristics 
valued in the market. It is important, however, to have an understanding of the product 
attributes in each segment because these are the characteristics that a firm is seeking to achieve 
as it moves from one market segment to another.  At the risk of some simplification, we focus 
on two broad characteristics that might push a product from a low to a high price segment:  
quality and sophistication.6  These two characteristics will sometimes co-vary, but not always.  
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Figure 3 uses the construction equipment industry to illustrate the range of market segments that 
are possible within a sector:  the highest-end segment (and the one with the most expensive 
products) is the blue box and the lowest-end segment (with the least expensive products) is the 
red box.    
In order to provide the more fine-grained analysis of Chinese capability building that 
we believe to be necessary, we have selected three sectors:  construction equipment, 
numerically-controlled machine tools, and automotive.  These are cases where aggregate 
numbers would lead us to believe that Chinese firms were increasingly losing out to FIEs, or at 
best, weakly holding their own. In Table 5, we provide a breakdown for these sectors that is 
analogous to the aggregate level provided in Table 1.7    From the perspective of 1995, the share 
of domestic firms was largest in construction equipment, followed by vehicles and then machine 
tools.8  Between 1995 and 2004, the behavior in construction and vehicles closely parallels the 
trends we observed for all of manufacturing.  In both sectors there is a significant increase in the 
role of FIEs selling in China, and this increase comes largely at the expense of the share of the 
market captured by domestic firms.  In machine tools, Chinese firms hold their own, but the role 
of FIEs in both the domestic market and exports rises.   
In short, in all three cases it appears that the position of FIEs is strengthening over time 
and that of domestic firms weakening, a trend that mirrors the situation for Chinese industry 
overall.  This assessment is too pessimistic, as we will see when we look at each of these sectors 
in more detail.  In the sector analysis that follows, we supplement data from industrial 
yearbooks and other sources with data that have been collected during firm-level interviews in 
China.  In each sector we visited the key domestic and foreign OEM firms in the sector.  
Typically, a firm visit would involve multiple interviews with the managers of key departments 
within the firm (i.e. purchasing/sourcing, production, R&D, sales/marketing).  Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in English and/or Mandarin Chinese (depending on the respondent) 
and generally lasted for 45 to 60 minutes.  We then used the same approach in visits to key 
suppliers in each sector.   Since 2005, we have conducted approximately 150 interviews in the 
three sectors.   
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Autos 
In 1986, the central government designated the auto sector as a “pillar” of the national 
economy.  Development efforts for passenger vehicles focused on joint ventures (JVs) with 
foreign firms and the development of basic manufacturing capabilities in the sector.  There were 
also a small number of wholly-owned domestic firms that began producing small cars with 
licensed-technology, but the primary emphasis of government policy was leveraging the desire 
of foreign firms to enter China as a means of gaining access to technology.   
Segmentation in the market during this early period of growth was limited, primarily 
because it was an “institutional” market composed of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
agencies, and competition was leisurely.  By the late 1990s, slightly more than a half a million 
passenger cars were being produced, five out of every six of which were produced by FIEs. 
Roughly half of all cars produced was by JVs involving Volkswagen with Shanghai Auto and 
the First Auto Works, both of which were established in the late 1980s.  Much smaller volumes 
were produced by relatively new JVs formed between General Motors (GM) and Shanghai 
Auto, and Honda and Guangzhou Automotive Industrial Group.    
The competitive dynamics of the sector were radically transformed beginning in the 
years leading up to China’s entry into WTO, driven by multiple causes: falling tariffs, increases 
in domestic capacity and supply, and rapidly rising incomes.  First, tariffs for small vehicles (1.6 
liters or less) decreased from 80% in 1998 to 25% in 2006, and from an even higher base for 
larger cars.  Tariffs on parts and components have always been lower, but they too have fallen 
from 20-25% to an average of 10% in 2006.  Second, tariff reduction was complemented by 
enormous capacity expansion in the industry, both in the form of new entry from foreign 
multinationals and domestic firms, and also expansion by incumbents.  Third, the domestic 
market shifted from one that was dominated by institutional buyers, who were relatively 
insensitive to price (and often had a politically-motivated regional bias), to one that is 
dominated by individual buyers who are extremely sensitive to price and value.   
The result of these changes was intense competition within the sector.  Prices have 
decreased dramatically at the same time that car quality has improved.9  As cost pressures on 
firms and the supply chain have intensified, firms have been forced to look for ways to improve 
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efficiency and productivity.  By 2007, the domestic market share of Chinese auto manufacturers 
in terms of unit sold had increased to 30.3 percent. BYD, Chery and Geely were among the 
largest of the newly emerging Chinese firms. 
To make sense of the success of domestic Chinese firms in the face of increasing 
competition, it is necessary to divide the overall market for autos into segments.  In the Chinese 
context, a reasonable measure for product sophistication is engine size—low-end cars tend to 
have an engine displacement of 1.4 litres and below (mini-cars), the middle of the market is 
roughly 1.4 to 1.6 litres (compact cars), and the high end is above 1.6 litres (mid-size cars and 
bigger)—and the size of the car tends to co-vary with quality.10  Smaller engine displacement is 
also much more likely to be associated with manual transmissions, as well as drum or disk 
brakes rather than automatic braking systems (ABS). In Figure 4, we provide a breakdown of 
production by six market segments for the FIEs and Chinese firms for 2000 and 2006.11  
In 2000, the largest market segment was upper medium, to which only JVs sold cars. 
Included in this market segment were vehicles such as the VW Santana, Audi A4, GM Buick, 
etc. With the exception of a small amount of production aimed for the luxury market, Chinese 
car manufacturers were heavily concentrated in the production of small or mini cars, in which 
they had most of the market.   By 2006, the center of gravity in the Chinese market had clearly 
shifted to less expensive cars.  The fastest growth was in the lower-medium segment, in which 
car production totaled 1.25 million vehicles.  Small car production was just shy of a million 
units. Combined, these two segments represented half of all production, up from slightly less 
than a third in 2000. And in both of these segments, Chinese firms did well in face of significant 
competition and entry of new models from the JVs.  
Figure 5 provides a summary of the number of new models that were introduced by car 
segment. Although Chinese assembly firms, or original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), lost 
share in the small car market as models such as the GM Sail and Honda Fit were successfully 
introduced, these firms increased their share in the lower-medium market. In two car segments 
catering to higher-income buyers, namely, SUVs and minivans, Chinese firms also did well, but 
quantitatively, it was their success in the lower-medium market that explains their rising market 
share over this period.  
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Construction Equipment 
The foreign share of China’s market for construction equipment has increased 
dramatically over the last decade (see Table 5).  When the evolution of the sector is broken 
down by market segment, however, it becomes clear that domestic firms dominate certain 
segments and are making gains in others.   
The construction equipment sector includes a wide variety of products (cranes, pavers, 
graders, wheel loaders, dump trucks, scrapers, excavators, etc.) and we focus on two in 
particular:  wheel loaders and excavators.  These two were selected because the sophistication 
of the products varies widely.12  For both types of machines, reliability is critical.  Due to the 
expense of the machines, both machines will often be operated 24 hours a day.  The machines 
are also often used in extreme environments, where exposure to dust, dirt, and the elements 
more generally, can affect the performance of the machine.   This imposes additional 
requirements on design and manufacturing.  
The engineering of an excavator however is considerably more complicated.  It runs on 
high hydraulic pressure, which makes the cylinders, and the valves that control the flow within 
the hydraulic system critical because they are under enormous pressure during operation. The 
machine has to both turn and swing on the platform; the electronic controls within the cab are 
like a video game; and the integration of hydraulics, engine, and electronics is complex.  
Manufacturing requirements are also significantly higher.    
  Within both the wheel loader and excavator segments, there is also significant 
heterogeneity.  In the case of wheel loaders, for example, quarries and mines will typically 
demand larger and more reliable machines, as will ports. A factory, on the other hand, will use 
the machine for minor utility functions and will look for the most economical model.  Thus, 
upgrading in the sector can occur within product segments as well as between products.   
The Chinese market for the less sophisticated product, the wheel loader, is dominated 
by domestic firms (see Tables 6 and 7).   Despite relatively low final tariffs, imports have been 
marginal, and almost all of the enormous increase in domestic demand—primarily for 3 and 5 
ton wheel loaders--has been met by firms manufacturing in China.  These firms are almost 
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exclusively Chinese, they are largely SOEs, and the dominant firms have been increasing their 
overall market share.  The share of the top 4 producers—Liugong, Longgong, Xiagong, and 
Lingong—has increased from 40 percent in 1999 to 65 percent in 2007, and these firms occupy 
a “premier” segment within the wheel-loader category.13  In 2006, FIEs captured at most 14.25 
percent14 of domestic demand, and half of this was the result of Caterpillar’s acquisition of a 
Chinese state-owned firm.15  Volvo’s acquisition of Lingong in 2007 increased significantly the 
role of FIEs to slightly less than 25 percent.     
In contrast to wheel loaders, the market for the more technologically-sophisticated 
excavators has been dominated by foreign firms.  Tables 8 and 9 provide information for 
excavators comparable to that discussed above for wheel loaders.  Foreign firms serve the local 
market both through production in China (54.5 percent16  of the market in 2006) and through 
imports (40.6 percent in 2006).  At the high-end of the market the position of the multinational 
firms is not in danger of being challenged, but the high price of the products that these firms 
manufacture has opened the door for less expensive excavators.  In the last three or four years, 
there has been significant entry and a very pronounced expansion in the production of 
excavators by Chinese firms.  In 2007, total sales of Chinese firms, both domestically and 
overseas, nearly doubled to over 20,000 units.  Much of the increase in production went to the 
domestic market, and the market share of domestic firms in the excavator market climbed from 
5 percent in 2006 to 11 percent in 2007.  Preliminary estimates for 2008 suggest a further rise, 
with Sanyi and Liugong emerging as important domestic players.   
In short, although the foreign firms are secure in their dominance of the construction 
equipment market segments characterized by both high quality and high sophistication (the 
upper right segment of Figure 3), the domestic firms are moving into higher quality segments of 
the low-end products (wheel loaders) and the low-end of the high sophistication products 
(excavators).  
 
CNC Machine Tools 
China’s machine tool industry is an over US $20 billion industry (2007 GVIO 
estimate)—smaller only than those of Japan and Germany—and is made up of nearly 2,500 
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firms and over a half a million workers.  Rapid growth and upgrading in a broad range of 
domestic manufacturing sectors have driven the rapid growth in demand for machine tools in 
China, and since 2002 it has been the largest market for machine tools in the world.   
Broadly defined, machine tools refer to any stationary, power-driven machine that is 
used to cut, shape, or form materials such as metal and wood.17  We focus on the largest product 
segment in the machine tool industry:  metal-cutting machine tools (jinshu qiexiao jichuang), 
the most important of which are lathes. 18  This segment includes both manually controlled 
machines and computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines, and represents approximately 
a third of the entire machine tool segment in China.  CNC machine tools also differ significantly 
in terms of their complexity, and at the risk of some simplification, we will divide CNC 
machines into three basic types: the low end is single-axis, single-function CNC machine tools; 
the mid-range are 2-axis CNC lathes and machining centers that use a single spindle; the high 
end are multiple-spindle, multiple axis (up to 5), multi-function, high speed and precision 
machine tools.19  These machines differ in terms of the speed, precision, and the complexity of 
the shapes that can be manufactured.20  
Domestic demand for metal-cutting machine tools increased rapidly between 1997 and 
2006, with the acceleration particularly intense after China’s entry into the WTO. Total 
expenditure on metal cutting machine tools rose from US $1.38 billion in 1997 to US $7  billion 
in 2006, and in the CNC segment from US$0.22 billion to 2.74 billion.  In quantity terms 
demand for CNC machine tools increased from 15,200 units in 1997 to 107,482 by 2006, a 
seven-fold increase (Table 10).   
 The enormous increase in demand was met by both imports and Chinese production.  
Domestic production rose from 9,051 units in 1997 to 85,756 units in 2006, most of which was 
destined for the domestic market. Imports increased from 6,200 units in 1997 to 33,693 units in 
2006.  The percentage of domestic demand for CNC machines met by imports declined in 
quantity terms from 60% in 1996 to 31% in 2006, but this is slightly misleading.21  Imported 
machines tended to be the more sophisticated machines that occupied the high end segment of 
the market (e.g. universal CNC machines and machining centers).  The price of the average 
imported machine rose significantly between 1997 and 2006—reflecting increasing complexity 
 16
of the “average” import--and was on average 3.5 to 4 times more expensive than a domestically-
produced CNC machine.22     
Unfortunately, we do not have data that will allow us to provide the sort of breakdown 
of domestic sales that we provided for autos and construction equipment.  The trends in the 
sector appear to be very similar to what we observed in autos and construction, however.  
Despite significant entry by FIEs producing in China (initially through JVs and increasingly 
through wholly-owned ventures), the domestic firms continue to hold much of the domestic 
market captured by firms actually producing in China, particularly for less sophisticated 
products.  In the case of CNC lathes, which are half of the overall CNC market, Chinese firms 
have succeeded in raising their share of the domestic market from 70 percent by volume (42 
percent by value) in 2001 to 81 percent (60 percent by value) in 2005 (China Machine Tool 
Industry Association 2007:  220).     
Domestic firms have also made significant in-roads with more sophisticated products 
such as machining centers.  Between 1996 and 2005, sales of machining centers grew rapidly in 
China, and represented nearly twenty percent of all metal-cutting CNC machines consumed 
domestically in 2005.  By 2005, nearly 30% of these machines were manufactured within China 
(see Figure 6).  This percentage includes both domestic firms and FIEs, but China’s Machine 
Tool Manufacturer’s Association estimates the machining center sales of Chinese firms to be 
approximately 2,500 to 3,000, implying that domestic firms were supplying roughly 20% of the 
domestic market for machining centers. Price data reported in Table 11 supports the view that 
Chinese firms are succeeding in the lower-end of these more sophisticated product markets.  For 
example, in the case of vertical machining centers, the average price of which was slightly more 
than $US 70,000, Chinese machining centers were a third less than the price of imports.   
In summary, much like in autos and construction equipment, domestic machine tool 
producers appear to be dominating large and rapidly growing low-end market segments and 
gradually increasing their share of more sophisticated product segments.   The key issue to 
understand is how the dynamics of competition within each of these market segments help a 
domestic Chinese firm take advantage of existing capabilities and to develop new ones.  In the 
three sections that follow, we examine each market segment in turn. 
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III. The Battle at the Bottom 
The low-end segment provides a crucial initial stepping stone for indigenous Chinese 
firms.  Intrinsic in much of the development literature is the idea that the gap between the 
expectations of export markets and the capabilities of indigenous firms is too wide to bridge.  
Building on Hobday, for example, Hubert Schmitz (2007) argues that late-comer firms face two 
primary problems when they attempt to integrate with the global economy:  a “technology gap” 
and a “marketing gap.”  The technology gap is a result of being cut-off from international 
sources of technology (and in particular the feedback loop between users and producers that 
spurs innovation), the difficulty of accessing proprietary technology, and weak national and/or 
local support for innovation.  These technologies may include the “hard” technologies that are 
embodied in production machinery and product designs or “soft” managements systems such as 
quality control or supply chain management.  “The technology gap,” according to Schmitz 
(2007:  421), “is lower in mature industries where technological requirements are well 
understood and change slowly.”  The marketing gap is a result of the difficulty a firm will have 
understanding and responding to rapidly changing consumer demand when it is disconnected 
from the market.  It is exacerbated by highly concentrated retail sectors (which shifts leverage 
within the value chain to the buyer) and the capital intensity of developing a brand.  The 
combination of the technology and the marketing gap create a barrier that firms in developing 
countries must overcome if they are to succeed in export markets.   Too wide a technology gap 
also prevents a firm from benefiting from absorbing the knowledge and technology spillovers 
that may result from FDI (Crespo and Fontoura 2007:  413).   
What if a firm is focusing on its home market rather than export markets?  Within the 
Chinese domestic market the “technology gap” confronting a domestic firm is smaller because 
at current income levels the market places a premium on price rather than technical 
sophistication.  As a result, the technical demands of the products within the sector are within 
the range of domestic firm’s manufacturing capabilities:  the designs are widely available 
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(either through copying or licensing) and the manufacturing processes are not highly 
demanding and/or are processes with which domestic firms have extensive experience.23  These 
products are in contrast to those that might be demanded by export markets; products that 
require very high levels of manufacturing capability (i.e. to achieve a certain level of quality 
and consistency) and designs and technologies that are proprietary.  Similarly, the “marketing 
gap” that Chinese firms face when exporting to advanced industrial countries will largely 
disappear when they focus on their domestic market.  There is the potential that foreign firms 
with powerful brands will continue to have an advantage, but domestic firms will be better 
attuned to consumer preferences.  In fact, there is a strong possibility that it is foreign firm that 
will face a “marketing gap” in China (at least initially), particularly when China is only a small 
portion of their overall portfolio.  These firms will also likely be handicapped by a weaker sales 
and distribution networks. 
The prospects for upgrading in the context of the domestic market are enhanced when 
the low-end segment is within the technical capabilities of domestic firms, the size of the low-
end segment is large, and the rate of change within the sector is relatively slow.24  The size of 
the low-end segment is important because the key benefit that a firm gains from dominating 
such a segment is high production volumes.  High volumes facilitate learning-by-doing, support 
the development of a deep network of domestic supply firms (which in turn allows a domestic 
OEM to lower costs), and generate the revenues that support upgrading efforts.  The rate of 
change is critical because it determines the ability of a Chinese firm to recoup the investment 
that upgrading requires. If the rate of change is too fast, a firm that has gone through a laborious 
and costly process of upgrading could find that market demand has already shifted by the time 
it gets its product to market.  Firms will only invest in upgrading when they expect to receive 
an adequate return on their investment, and large low-end segments and a relatively slow rate of 
change increase the likelihood of high returns on the investment required by upgrading.   
The sectors that we focus on in this paper all have large low-end segments and 
relatively slow rates of change, and these characteristics provided the foundation for upgrading 
activities.  The low-end product in the construction equipment sector consists of wheel loaders, 
and this segment is dominated by domestic Chinese firms.  Partly this success is a result of a 
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relatively simple product technology that is well-suited to the strengths of Chinese firms.  The 
labor intensity of fabrication and assembly, for example, confer a significant cost advantage to 
Chinese firms.  In the machining process, an earlier generation of lathes can be used rather than 
CNC machines; the welding can be also done manually rather than robotically.   
As important, however, is the depth of experience that Chinese firms have with this 
product.  As early as the 1960s, Chinese firms were using technology licensed from Japanese 
firms.  In the 1980s, there were two primary sources of technology in the sector:  the Ministry 
of Machinery, which licensed Caterpillar (CAT) technology for both complete vehicles and 
core components on behalf of core state-owned firms within the sector, and the Tianjin Heavy 
Machinery Research Institute, which developed its own set of designs that drew on a 
combination of foreign models.  With the help of both CAT technical assistance and the support 
of the Tianjin Research Institute, firms were able to master the necessary technologies and 
incrementally improve on the original designs.  These early designs are usually the basis for the 
models that are produced today, although incremental improvements have changed them 
beyond recognition.  The use of designs that have been around for several decades in China has 
facilitated the development of a broad and low-cost supply base, and this creates critical cost-
savings for the OEM, which generally out-source 60 to 70% of total costs. 
In the Chinese machine tool industry, firms similarly combine a strong foundation in 
the industry with a specialization on less technically sophisticated product areas.  In the pre-
reform era, China had an extensive machine tool industry that was dominated by SOEs.  Long 
isolated from global markets, these firms were still producing traditional or conventional 
machine tools at the end of the 1970s, and it was only when research institutes under key 
ministries (e.g. Beijing Machine Tool Institute and the Beijing Electrical Machinery Research 
Institute) and leading firms began to license and reverse engineer technology in the 1980s that 
CNC machines began to be produced.  In the mid-1990s, the industry was highly dispersed.  
There were upwards of 100 SOEs producing various kinds of CNC metal-cutting machine 
tools, but total production volumes remained low at less than 10,000 units. Over the next 
decade, there was rapid expansion in CNC production, especially of economical (jingjixing) 
CNC machines.  In the lathe segment of the market, there were more than 50 Chinese firms 
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producing 40,000 CNC lathes in 2006, for instance, 80% of which were classified as 
economical.  
Several factors contributed to the rapid growth of CNC production at the low-end.  
Especially important was the entry and an increase in the number of producers.  A majority of 
these firms were SOEs, which continue to dominate the market, but their numbers have fallen 
slightly as a result of bankruptcy and M&A activity.  There has also been a significant increase 
in the number of private firms in the sector. Private firms often build upon the foundation that 
was established by the state sector:  they take advantage of the widely-available designs for the 
basic class of CNC machine, they tap into the pool of expertise in CNC design and 
manufacturing that was nurtured by key research institutes and SOEs, and they tap into a well-
developed domestic supply base for critical parts and components that has emerged. 
  Key components going into the CNC machine—e.g. the spindle, bearings, ball screws, 
motors, and numerical controls—represent 70 percent of the cost, and are typically out-sourced. 
Initially, Chinese firms were forced to import many of these components, usually from the firm 
that licensed the original product technology (or one of its suppliers), but over time there has 
been nearly complete localization at the first-tier of the supply chain.25  Common machine 
design means that Chinese manufacturers are often buying nearly identical components from 
the same set suppliers.26   
To provide two examples, GSK in Guangzhou now dominates the market for low-end 
numerical controls, and in 2006, sold over 30,000 systems, or a third of the entire market.27  
Han River Precision Machinery Company in Shanxi has become the major domestic supplier of 
ball-screws.  Both are critical to machine precision. Foreign suppliers have established 
operations in China, but they typically serve the high-end of the marker, including exports, and 
generally have prices that are 1/3 to 1/2 more expensive than their domestic competitors.  
Although the system and components produced by GSK and Han River are not to the levels of 
the foreign firms, they allow domestic CNC manufacturers to achieve a level of precision and 
functionality that meets the demands of Chinese customers. 
The capabilities within the Chinese automotive industry at the start of the reform period 
were negligible, and consisted primarily of truck production.  Efforts to develop capabilities in 
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passenger vehicles focused on joint ventures with foreign firms.  The restrictions imposed on 
foreign firms were heavy—they were forbidden from holding more than a 50% stake in 
assembly projects and were required to quickly increase the percentage of components 
purchased form domestically-based firms—but the highly protected market and limited 
competition provided considerable incentive for foreign firms to be a partner in the 
developmental efforts of their domestic partners (Thun 2006).  Few foreign firms were willing 
to bring their most recent technology to China—VW controlled over 50% of the market in the 
mid-1990s with a model based on 1970s technology—but in many respects, this was exactly 
what domestic firms needed:  the technology that was being transferred and the capabilities that 
were being developed throughout the supply base was in line with the initial level of their 
manufacturing capabilities of Chinese firms and slow rate of change gave these firms time to 
improve.  The primary complaint of the Chinese government was that there were few 
independent domestic brands that could compete with the foreign-invested joint ventures 
products.    
When the terms of accession to the WTO were agreed upon at the end of the 1990s, 
few observers expected that an increase in competition would lead to the rapid growth of 
independent Chinese automakers, but this is exactly what happened.  Firms such as BYD, 
Chery and Geely were able to take advantage of rapid growth in the low-end segment of the 
market, and currently, independent Chinese firms control nearly a third of the domestic market. 
A common explanation of this success emphasizes IPR violations, but this is only part of the 
story.  Independent domestic firms are often more flexible because, unlike the foreign firms, 
they are not selling products that are designed for developed (and high-cost) markets.  Their 
primary focus is the Chinese marketplace.  They do not have to seek the approval of a global 
headquarters to certify new suppliers or launch new models, and when market demand shifts, 
they can respond quickly.  Moreover, because their products are designed specifically for the 
low-end of the domestic market, the designs are based on a “good-enough” standard, which 
allows them to increase the use of low-cost suppliers (as opposed to the global suppliers that 
support the JVs).   
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To give one example, a domestic Tier 2 supplier in Zhejiang Province has both a JV 
and a wholly-owned facility that manufacture the same component.  Both facilities are located 
in the same complex, and the management is the same.  The JV achieves a defect rate of 50 
PPM compared to 300 to 500 PPM at the wholly-owned facility but has a 20% higher cost.  The 
reason for the cost difference is that the higher quality standard requires a higher degree of 
automation (and hence more expensive equipment) and imported rubber seals (Interview 
083007).   
As we observe in other sectors, the independent Chinese auto firms are taking 
advantage of a manufacturing base that was nurtured over the course of decades.  A firm such 
as Shanghai Volkswagen was forced by the strict localization requirements to train domestic 
suppliers, many of which were JVs located in Shanghai, and as cost pressure increased, these 
suppliers were forced to train lower tier (and low-cost) suppliers in neighbouring Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu.  These lower tier domestic firms are the core suppliers for the domestic OEMs.   
Summary data reported in Figure 6 from a 2006 study on OEM sourcing are illustrative in this 
regard. Sixty percent of first-tier suppliers to Chinese OEMs were domestic firms, compared to 
only 15 percent for OEMs from advanced countries producing in China.    
In short, the Chinese domestic firms in the construction, machine tool, and automotive 
sectors achieved rapid growth by focusing on rapidly growing product segments in which the 
technical barriers to entry were surmountable and the rate of change was relatively slow.  
Domestic firms could combine their solid foundations in each of these sectors with their 
knowledge and capacity to meet the needs of domestic consumers in order to capture market 
share at the low-end.  The relatively low barriers to entry in these segments are a double-edged 
sword, however:  the competition between domestic firms within these segments is intense and 
profit margins are low.  Product differentiation between producers of economical CNC 
machines, wheel loaders, and small cars is minimal, price competition is intense, and profit 
margins are low.  This is exactly the type of dynamic that, according to Steinfeld, prevents 
firms from upgrading:  “Once the cost pressures become too intense, rather than moving 
upward into higher end activities or taking the time to develop proprietary skills, the firms 
diversify into other low barrier markets (2004:  1976).”  The expectation is that intense 
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competition will lead to cutthroat discounting and the proliferation of small producers because 
none are able to develop the proprietary knowledge that translates into a durable competitive 
advantage. 
Despite this expectation, the evidence in the three sectors that we have analyzed 
indicates that the competitive environment has not prevented select Chinese firms from 
growing very rapidly and for gradual consolidation to have begun in some market segments.28 
The key question is why some firms emerge from the pack at the low-end and others do not.  
We will return to this question in Section V.   
 
IV.  Pressure at the Top 
Multinational firms often enjoy a privileged place in China’s economic landscape.  
With the benefit of superior technology and powerful brands, they are able to dominate the high 
value-added segments of the market.  These are exactly the segments that Chinese firms aspire 
to occupy.  The problem, however, is that the highest growth is in the low- and mid-range of 
the market, and the cost structure of a multinational firm makes it difficult to compete in these 
segments. 
If a foreign firm is manufacturing in China, why is it not able to achieve the same cost 
levels as a Chinese competitor?  The cost structure is closely tied to the global strategy of a 
multinational firm.  Pankaj Ghemewat (2007:  199) groups the global strategies of multinational 
firms into three different categories—aggregation, adaptation, and arbitrage—and argues that 
the motivations for each strategy will vary.  Firms that aggregate seek to take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope by standardizing products and processes globally (and the 
motivation is usually the high cost of R&D relative to sales); firms that pursue adaptation strive 
to achieve local relevance by adapting to local conditions (while ideally controlling the cost of 
excessive variety and complexity); firms that seek arbitrage opportunities exploit the 
specialized advantages that are available in a diverse set of locations (and deploy these 
advantages globally).  The dominant strategy in the sectors that we analyze is aggregation—all 
are capital intensive and have high R&D costs—and this strategy shapes the cost structure of 
firms.   
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Although a strategy of aggregation allows a firm to maximize global economies of 
scale, it can have the unintended result of locking a firm into a high-end segment of a market 
when they seek to expand into the developing world.  First, because the product is designed for 
advanced markets, and the firm is seeking to limit the extent of adaptation, the product may be 
more sophisticated and of higher quality than the market in a developing economy demands.  A 
“good enough” market (or market segment) seeks reliable-enough products at low-enough 
prices.   (Gadiesh, Leung et al. 2007).  It is often not easy to lower the costs of the products 
because their sophistication and quality requires more capital (and technology) intensive 
manufacturing operations.29  Second, the foreign firm is often required to use components from 
global suppliers because only these components will meet the exacting specification required 
by the designs (and needless to say, common components will also maximize global economies 
of scale).30  In many cases, an OEM firm relies on key suppliers for design capabilities and this 
dependence generates additional incentives to bring global suppliers to China (what has been 
called “follow sourcing”) or to import key components. Finally, the location and global 
orientation of design activities reinforces the bias against fully utilizing low-cost domestic 
suppliers.  The process of getting a local supplier approved by the design center at headquarters 
(in conformance with a global design policy) can be time-consuming and difficult, and the 
absence of a local design center makes it difficult to provide local suppliers the engineering 
support they need to upgrade their manufacturing levels to the appropriate standards.     
The solution is for the multinational firm to shift from a global approach that 
emphasizes global economies of scale to an approach that allows for localization, or what 
Ghemawat would call adaptation.  Localization can take place at multiple levels.  At the 
assembly level, a first step is to move manufacturing operations to China, and at this point all 
major automotive, construction equipment, and machine tool manufacturers have operations in 
China.  It is at the level of purchasing that localization is most critical:  60 to 70% of the total 
costs of final products in the automotive, construction equipment, and machine tool sectors 
consist of out-sourced components and it is here that costs can be most dramatically cut.  
Typically, the rate of location will rise as the technical sophistication of the product or model 
falls.   
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In the auto sector, the Chinese government has always exerted pressure on foreign 
firms to utilize local suppliers, but given the strong incentives for global OEMs to continue 
sourcing from their global suppliers, there were also many means of evading these 
restrictions.31  Competition in the Chinese market forces the localization of purchasing far more 
comprehensively than government regulation because firms that rely too heavily on imported 
components (or global suppliers that import components) have difficulty lowering their costs.  
After the market share of Volkswagen fell from 56% in 1996 to 16% in 2005, for example, the 
company announced a restructuring program that sought to reduce costs by 40% through an 
aggressive localization program.32  Other OEM firms have made similar efforts, and the 
competitive pressure that drives these localization efforts spreads throughout the supply 
network.     
Firm A, a global automotive supply firm operating in Shanghai, illustrates the manner 
in which competition forces localization.  The firm was under pressure from its foreign OEM 
customers to lower costs and unable to win contracts from domestic OEMs due to high costs. 
The solution to both problems was increased localization.  The source of the problem was not 
labor costs, which were only .5% of total costs (as compared to 30% in its home country), but 
the high standard of its manufacturing operations and the equipment that this requires.  The 
foreign OEM that was its primary customer demanded a defect rate of 6 parts per million 
(PPM), which required a high degree of automation and expensive testing equipment.  
Domestic firms that produced the same component used a more labor-intensive manufacturing 
processes, testing consisted of a visual check at the end of the assembly line, and the overall 
cost structure was much lower.33  Firm A could compete for the business of a foreign OEM by 
maintaining its quality level and lowering costs through increased out-sourcing, but it could not 
compete for the business of domestic OEMs (which accepted far higher defect rates) without 
very high rates of localization.  When the localization rate was at 95% or above by value (i.e. 
only machining and assembly is done in-house), the firm could match the price of it Chinese 
competitors, but as the localization slipped below 90%, the Chinese competitors would have a 
10-20% price advantage (Interview 083107).   
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A similar dynamic is evident in the machine tool industry.  Initially, firms were largely 
involved in the machining of the base of the CNC machine, and assembly operations using 
imported parts and components, but over time localization has increased both inside and outside 
the firm. The latter opportunities have expanded as key suppliers in the industry have also set 
up factories in China to service overseas customers.  For less demanding parts and components, 
the foreign firms are able to take advantage of the low capabilities that were described in the 
previous section.  Taiwanese CNC manufacturers in the lower Yangtze region, for instance, 
have been very successful in finding local suppliers for 60% of their parts.34  One JV firm we 
interviewed put the costs of manufacturing universal CNC machines in 2007 in China 
compared to Japan, exclusive of the costs of the technology, at half, with a good portion of this 
coming from lower sourcing costs. 
In the construction equipment sector, foreign firms are under the same pressure as in 
the other sectors, but because their dominant product (the excavator) occupies a premium 
segment, the opportunities for using domestic supply firms are fewer.  Firms take great care not 
to outsource components that could sacrifice performance or components that involve core 
proprietary knowledge.  The cutting edge of a bucket, for instance, is proprietary at one firm 
(and receives special heat treatment), and this will be imported from abroad while a local 
supplier makes the rest of the bucket (Interview 081007b).35  The problem, of course, is that the 
high cost of these products prices them out of the largest portion of the domestic market in 
China.   
A common solution in recent years has been to purchase (or invest in) a Chinese 
company.  The acquisition strategy is attractive because it allows the foreign firm to avoid 
many of the problems that have been highlighted in this section:  the products of the Chinese 
firms are designed for the domestic market (rather than high-end global markets), the firms 
have lower cost structures, and they have well-developed networks of domestic suppliers 
(Interview 120907).  The foreign firm acquires these low-cost operations and then seeks to 
upgrade the product by improving upon the processes and technology that the firm employs.  It 
is sometimes easier to increase the capabilities of a low-cost domestic manufacturing operation 
than it is to decrease the cost at a high-cost foreign operation. 
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An aggressive approach to localizing purchasing necessitates a certain amount of 
localization of design and engineering.  A design center facilitates the localization of 
component purchasing because the design staff can work with local suppliers to increase their 
manufacturing capabilities.  Several factors are important. First, the foreign firm needs trained 
personnel and engineers who are capable of working with local suppliers to help them improve 
their manufacturing and quality control processes.  Quality engineers are critically important 
and particularly ones that speak Chinese.  Both the OEM firms and the Tier 1 suppliers have 
large teams in China that will conduct surveys of potential Chinese suppliers, and then 
essentially live in the factories while working with them to improve their quality standards.  
The Chinese supplier is delivering a component that will go into a product with a foreign brand, 
so the foreign customer has every incentive to teach the supplier well. Second, the foreign firm 
needs the capability within house to make modest design modifications to their products in 
order to facilitate lower cost sourcing without sacrificing either performance or quality (and this 
follows a long tradition in the auto industry of changing designs for manufacturability).36  
Finally, and a point that relates equally to OEM and supply firms, a design center in China 
allows a foreign firm to be more responsive to the demands of domestic market.     
 
V.  Fight for the Middle 
Thus far we have described two dominant dynamics in Chinese industry:  the intense 
competition at the low-end of the market that drives domestic firms to search for a durable 
source of competitive advantage and the pressure on foreign firms at the high-end of the market 
to lower their cost structures.  It is in the middle segment of the market that domestic and 
foreign firms clash, and the expectation in much of the existing literature is that foreign firms 
should have the upper hand in this contest.   The intensity of the competition in Chinese 
industry limits the ability of Chinese firms to upgrade their capabilities and move beyond 
commodity production; the superior technology of foreign firms gives them a considerable 
advantage when they decide to lower their cost structures and move into lower end segments 
(Dunning 1988).37  The data we presented in Section II, however, demonstrates that the reality 
is considerably more complex:  there are firms that are upgrading their capabilities, evidence of 
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increasing concentration among domestic firms, and there are indications (albeit mixed) that 
domestic firms have made inroads in the middle segments of the market vis-à-vis foreign firms.   
The initial challenge for a Chinese firm is to emerge from the scrum of domestic firms 
that are competing at the low-end of the market.  This requires an escalation in firm efforts in 
capability-building—through investments in R&D, human resources, management processes, 
physical capital, etc.—that will enable it to improve the quality of existing products and to 
produce more sophisticated products.  Firms undertake these investments under the belief that 
the market will sufficiently reward them to cover the costs of their investments.  A firms’ 
success will be ultimately tied to a variety of factors including its existing set of capabilities, its 
ability to take advantage of potential channels of capability-building, and its ability to finance 
the required new investments.   
Over time, a combination of development and liberalization in the Chinese economy 
has expanded and deepened the channels through which firms can build capabilities and 
upgrade.  These include tapping resources formerly bottled up in the state sector, the use of 
consultants, and especially interactions with foreign-invested enterprises operating in China.  
These have been complemented by an increase in outward FDI, which through mergers and 
acquisitions has been used by a small, but growing number of firms to help acquire critical 
capabilities. 
In this section we focus first on the means by which some domestic firms are able to 
differentiate themselves from the many competitors within a sector.  We then explain how the 
interaction of domestic firms striving to upgrade and foreign firms struggling to lower costs 
offers a new range of opportunities for domestic Chinese firms.   
 
Leveraging existing capabilities 
The ability of firms to take advantage of the various channels for capability building is 
critically tied to their existing set of capabilities.  Some SOEs have successfully leveraged past 
investments in human resources, especially in design, engineering and manufacturing, as well 
as physical capital.  These pre-existing capabilities are neither necessary nor sufficient 
condition for successful upgrading, of course; numerous SOEs have failed, while new private 
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firms that are highly entrepreneurial have emerged.  There are common elements in the 
strategies that the successful state-owned and private firms have adopted, however.   
SOE dominance in some sectors can often be attributed to an explicit policy-bias, but 
what is unusual in the case of autos, machine tools, and construction equipment is that the state-
owned firms now compete in competitive markets alongside private and foreign firms.  
Although many of these firms continue to receive policy support, particularly from local 
governments, the primary advantage is the depth of experience with a particular product range.  
Extensive experience with a product design and strong engineering capabilities allow a state-
owned firm to make incremental improvements over time; feedback from customers over the 
course of decades leads to product and process changes, and this leads to continuous 
improvements in product quality.     
In the construction equipment sector, for instance, there are hundreds of firms that 
produce wheel loaders, and most of them produce models that are derived from one of the three 
designs (3, 5, and 8 ton models) that the Ministry of Machinery licensed from Caterpillar in 
1987.  The dominant firm in the sector, however, continues to be the same firm that was the 
initial licensee of the 5-ton model.  When the designs for this model became widely available in 
the 1990s, there was a high rate of entry from private sector firms and fierce price wars, but 
Firm B was able to maintain a dominant position through a process of steady, incremental 
improvement.  The current 5 ton model of the firm is considered a 3rd generation model and 
entails significant upgrading in design and technology:  it meets European and US 
environmental standards for road equipment, it utilizes a higher pressure hydraulic system (and 
has improved productivity), the engine is produced in a JV with a leading foreign firm, and the 
model has improved ergonomics and electronic controls (Interview 072808).  The firm is also 
able to utilize a broad distribution network to collect feedback from customers and the 
resources of a 400 person R&D centre to make the necessary changes.  Although the current 
product is derived from the same basic model that was licensed two decades ago, it is a very 
different machine, and the firm is able to charge a premium of 10-15 percent over competitors. 
A long history as an SOE also has disadvantages and many of these firms are 
struggling to restructure and improve governance, while at the same time seize the opportunity 
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provided by the depth of their resources.  SOEs will often be less flexible than private firms 
(and thus products cannot change rapidly) and less efficient.  In every sector, there are SOEs 
that have fallen by the wayside and ones that have continued to thrive.   Our purpose here is not 
to explain this heterogeneity, but to note that some SOEs have made significant progress 
towards transforming themselves.  
Private sector firms are more efficient and flexible than their SOE counterparts, but 
they often lack the manufacturing experience as well as strong design and engineering 
capabilities.  They also face financing constraints compared to some SOEs.  Nevertheless, in 
many cases they have managed to emerge as strong competitors.  The most successful means of 
compensating for limited resources is to concentrate resources.  A firm will focus on a 
particular product niche in which the domestic competition is not intense, dominate the 
segment, and then use the revenue generated to fund expansion into other areas.   
Firm C, for example, is one of the most rapidly growing firms in the Chinese 
construction equipment industry.  When the firm began producing concrete pumps in 1994, 85-
90% of the Chinese market was served by imports.  The firm initially had poor quality, but as 
the manager in the R&D institute explained, careful analysis of foreign products made it clear 
that there was nothing mysterious about the technology (Interview 111908a).  Early efforts 
benefited from linkages to a local state-run construction industry research institute; key 
components that were beyond the firm’s initial capabilities could be imported.  The primary 
competitors in the 1990s were SOEs that had management difficulties.  
As Firm C gained market share it was able to invest heavily in R&D personnel (many 
of whom were hired from state-owned competitors), and initial success in pumps funded 
expansion into higher value-added segments such as excavators.  By 2007, the firm controlled 
50% of the Chinese market for concrete pumps.  Total revenue was approximately 20 billion 
RMB, slightly less than half of which was from concrete pumps and mixers.  In the automotive 
parts sector, many of the most successful private sector firms have employed similar strategies:  
they choose a component segment that they can dominate and then use the revenue from this 
segment to fund investment in upgrading.  
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In short, the state-owned and private firms will often have a slightly different product 
focus—the former rely on incremental improvements to pre-existing products and the latter 
focus on niche markets—but the overall strategy is similar:  revenue from products that are 
characterized by relatively low technology gaps (relative to their capabilities) provide a secure 
source of revenue that can be used to help support the shift into technologically more 
sophisticated products. Machine tool manufacturers benefited from a robust market for their 
traditional lathes to develop capabilities in CNC machine tools; heavy construction 
manufacturers leverage sales from wheel loaders (or concrete pumps in the case of a private 
firm) to develop capabilities in excavators; auto firms dominated in small cars (or a particular 
component) and then moved into more sophisticated models (or components).  
 
Channels of capability building: State sector resources 
One of the most important channels for capability building is to draw on the resources 
that have been built up in the state sector over several decades.  Key firms and research 
institutes were beneficiaries of state-allocated investment capital, human capital--particularly in 
design and engineering--and technology licensing arrangements with firms from advanced 
countries.  These state-owned firms and institutes continue to play critical roles in these sectors, 
as do publically-funded universities, with which firms cooperate. 
Since the mid-1990s, resources from the state sector have become increasingly diffuse 
as commercialization of research institutes, and market competition within individual sectors 
has increased.  Both private and state-owned firms work with the former state-run research 
institutes as well as universities; the human capital that has been nurtured in state-owned firms 
(particularly with respect to engineering) begins to flow to those firms that offer the highest 
wages and most attractive working conditions; and bankruptcy in SOEs also often frees up 
valuable human resources, including entire R&D departments. 
 
Channels of capability building: Role of the foreign sector 
For both state and private firms, foreign firms have become a key source of knowledge 
and technology.  The last decade, China has been the largest recipient of FDI in the world, and 
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in 2008 FDI exceeded $US 90 billion. FIEs have become an important source of competition 
for some Chinese firms, and forced them to utilize resources more efficiently and upgrade their 
capabilities.  At the same time however, FIEs have become the most important channel of 
upgrading through demonstration and imitation effects, labor mobility, and backward and 
forward linkages (For a general discussion, see Crespo and Fontoura 2007).  Many of these 
have already been alluded to.  Foreign-invested firms have provided a demonstration of how to 
improve management processes, they train Chinese managers, introduce new technologies into 
the marketplace, and incorporate Chinese firms in their global supply chains (and thus 
increased the export capacity of Chinese firms).    
One of the most explicit channels of upgrading that is present in all three sectors is the 
use of joint ventures.  Initial Chinese efforts to master new products and manufacturing 
processes often began with various forms of technical licensing and short-term cooperation. 
These efforts often proved inadequate, and Chinese firms turned to joint ventures as a means of 
developing core competencies and/or expanding capabilities in core components and related 
product lines. Beijing Number 1 Machine Tool, for example, established a JV with Okuma, a 
leading Japanese firm, for the manufacture of a basic line of CNC machines. Shenyang 
Machine Tool, on the other hand, has entered into a number of JVs for the purpose of 
expanding into more sophisticated machining centers. The leading firm in wheel loaders (Firm 
B above) formed a JV that manufactures transmissions with a leading German company; 
leading auto firms have established JVs for the production of engines; domestic machine tool 
companies have formed JVs to acquire basic manufacturing knowledge, but also to expand 
product line.  
 More recently, Chinese firms have begun to look outward as a way to acquire critical 
capabilities, and market access. Wanxiang’s recent acquisition of four Dana auto-part plants in 
North America and acquisitions by Shenyang Machine Tool and Dalian Machine tool in the US 
and Germany are cases in point.   
The flow of human capital from foreign to domestic firms has also been an essential 
part of the upgrading process in China.  The domestic firms that are able to differentiate 
themselves from their domestic competitors are able to hire employees with training at foreign 
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firm firms.  The firms with the most resources (sometimes the result of state support) hire 
consultants and overseas returnees with multinational experience.  One leading domestic auto 
firm, for instance, staffed key technical positions with former employees of companies such as 
Ford, Visteon, Honda, Motorola, and TRW. As a returnee manager commented, the local 
engineers are very smart, but they have less experience with project management and real 
design work (Interview 080105).  The returnees, many of whom had come up against glass 
ceilings abroad, have the experience necessary to harness this local talent and push the 
development process forward far more quickly than would otherwise be the case.  Firms that 
are ambitious yet unable to afford the salaries demanded by returnees or pay the high fees of 
consultants, hire Chinese employees from the JVs and as well as recent  retirees from the JVs (a 
slightly cheaper option).38   
 
Uniqueness of Domestic-Foreign Interaction in China 
What is unusual in China is not the form of the channels that transmit knowledge and 
technology from foreign-invested firms to domestic firms, but the manner in which competitive 
dynamics of the Chinese market affects the depth of these channels.  The pressure on foreign 
firms to shed costs and capture a higher share of the middle segments of the market forces them 
to localize operations to a greater extent than otherwise, providing new opportunities for 
domestic firms.  Labor mobility and supply chain linkages provide the clearest example of how 
the fight for the middle fosters upgrading opportunities. 
Although the flow of talent between foreign-invested and domestic firms is hardly 
unique, the pressure on foreign firms to lower their costs in China encourages a shift of R&D 
activities from the home country to China.  Having design capability within China facilitates 
the localization of purchasing and allows the customization of designs for the Chinese 
marketplace.  It also serves to train Chinese engineers in the types of activities which, if not for 
the growing importance of the Chinese marketplace, would be conducted off-shore.  As foreign 
firms expand their R&D efforts in China, they also expand the talent pool of engineers that can 
be tapped by domestic firms.   
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The incentive to localize the sourcing of components is similarly accentuated by the 
competitive pressures of the Chinese market.  Again, the dominant global strategy of the firms 
in these three sectors is one of aggregation:  they seek to maximize global economies of scales 
and limit the degree of adaptation to individual markets.  In the high-end segments of the 
Chinese market, this strategy is feasible, but as firms move into the middle segments of the 
market, the degree of localization must increase both to lower the cost of the product and in 
order to adapt the product to the local market.  In many instances the changes might be slight, 
but they can have a major impact on the structure of the supply chain.   
In the auto sector, for instance, a foreign OEM is likely to continue to use a global 
supplier for systems that require extensive testing (such as airbags, ABS, and automatic 
transmissions for autos) and are technically sophisticated, but the price pressure exerted by the 
OEM firm will force the Tier 1 global supplier to outsource extensively to domestic firms.  As 
the technical director at a domestic supply firm explained, a Tier 1 global supplier will receive 
a contract from an OEM firm for a module that might contain 20 components, but only 5 of 
these can be profitably manufactured in-house.  The remainder is out-sourced to Chinese firms, 
but because the Tier 1 global supplier is responsible for quality levels, its engineers will 
carefully train and monitor the domestic firm (Interview 051607).39  Similarly, as the OEM firm 
begins to design the products specifically for the Chinese domestic market, the integrated 
nature of vehicle design means that even small changes in a global design can have a large 
impact on the supply chain.  Tier 1 suppliers in China must upgrade their design capabilities 
and each subsequent tier must increase their capabilities in order to meet the raised 
expectations.  
Foreign firms in the construction equipment sector have been aggressively establishing 
design centres in China, and a primary purpose is to improve the capabilities of domestic 
suppliers in the interests of lower overall cost structures.   One of the key characteristics that 
differentiate a foreign firm from a domestic firm in this sector is the ability to optimize the 
system in a product.  The hydraulic system, for instance, needs to be synchronized with the rest 
of the excavator, and this requires close collaboration between individual components, 
subassemblies, and the final assembler (Interview 112108).  As is common to firms in many 
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sectors when they first enter China, the foreign excavator firms initially rely heavily on foreign 
suppliers and imported components, but gradually seek to increase domestic content.  The 
development of design capabilities within China allows the foreign firms to send design teams 
and quality engineers to the Chinese suppliers.    
The competitive dynamic of the Chinese market not only accentuates the pressure on 
foreign firms to increase their utilization of domestic Chinese suppliers, thereby deepening the 
channels of upgrading created by these relationships, it also offers a new set upgrading 
opportunities for domestic suppliers with other domestic customers.  This is of critical 
importance because the relationships between foreign firms and their domestic suppliers are a 
complex mix of collaboration and competition.  At the same time that the foreign OEM firm 
seeks to pull a domestic supplier up the capability ladder, it will also seek to safeguard its own 
core technology.  It wants to avoid nurturing a future competitor.   However, the same domestic 
supplier will also have relationships with domestic OEM firms, and the needs of a domestic 
OEM are very different than a foreign OEM.  Rather than trying to limit the advancement of 
domestic suppliers, the domestic OEMs, themselves weak in design capabilities, are eager to 
have the domestic suppliers broaden and strengthen their capabilities.  Rather than force them 
to manufacture low-value added components in a lower tier of the value chain, the domestic 
OEMs encourage the domestic suppliers to occupy the first tier and provide full modules.  
Whereas a foreign customer will work on a “build-to-print” basis—i.e. give the supplier 
detailed designs to a component—a domestic OEM will give the supplier the general specs of 
what is needed, and expect the supplier to provide designs and testing.   
A technical director of a domestic auto supply firm compared the relationships with a 
foreign versus domestic OEM to a rectangle that is sitting on end as opposed to one that is lying 
flat.  The former symbolizes the relationship with a foreign company:  it is narrow and deep.  
The domestic supplier can achieve a high level of competence very quickly because a global 
supplier will be assisting them, but the range of capabilities will be narrow.  The latter 
represents the relationships with a domestic OEM:  the domestic supplier can learn a great 
breadth of things, but the knowledge is not as deep because the domestic OEM is not in a 
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position to provide as much assistance.  The natural conclusion, of course, is to have both sets 
of relationships; the one complements the other.   
 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have sought to show how domestic Chinese firms in certain sectors 
have managed to upgrade their capabilities and capture market share, despite aggregate 
numbers to the contrary.  In autos, machine tools as well as construction, several factors seem 
to be especially important to the upgrading prospects:  the absolute size of the low-end of the 
market, the technology (product or process) in the sector relative to the capabilities of domestic 
firms, and the rate of change in the sector.40   
The presence of a large (and rapidly growing) low-end of the domestic segment within 
the existing capabilities of firms provides an opportunity for domestic firms to increase 
production volumes and gain experience.  It is the bottom rung on the upgrading ladder, and the 
production volumes and revenue generated within this segment that supports the upgrading 
activities underpinning the shift into the higher-end segment.  The rate of change in the sector is 
also important.  If the product characteristics within a sector change too rapidly, a firm may 
soon find the capabilities it invested in to be obsolete as market demand shifts.     
When this market is demanding products that are of a technical or quality level such 
that only the strongest domestic firms within a sector are able to meet the demand (i.e. barriers 
to entry from below) and at a price that makes it difficult for foreign firms to compete (i.e. 
barriers to entry from above), there is a window of opportunity for strong domestic firms to 
emerge.  This window may not be open forever however. Rising incomes and an increase in 
demand for higher quality and more sophisticated products in the domestic market may shift the 
advantage towards foreign firms.  
The pressure on foreign firms to capture a larger share of the rapidly growing middle 
market segments is essential to the dynamic:  it leads them to accelerate the localization of their 
China operations, thereby providing further opportunities for domestic firms.  The role of this 
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pressure is a reminder of how important continued entry at both ends of the market can be to 
the upgrading process in China. 
Perhaps the most beneficial consequence of the “fight for the middle” dynamic is the 
manner in which it bolsters supplier capabilities.  A domestic OEM firm can often rapidly 
launch more sophisticated products by relying extensively on core foreign-made components. 
This may give the appearance of product upgrading, but it is a problematic strategy over the 
long-run because it often brings no cost advantage.41  Upgrading at the OEM level must be 
accompanied by upgrading at the supply level, and both foreign and domestic OEMs play 
distinct and important roles in this process.   
Because the foreign OEM firms are struggling to lower costs, they are increasingly 
willing to utilize domestic firms, and they work with these suppliers to improve their 
capabilities.  Domestic OEM firms provide less technical assistance, but they provide suppliers 
with an opportunity to increase the breadth of their capabilities, and often high volume 
business.  The combination of these two dynamics fosters capabilities at multiple levels in the 
value chain, with the depth of capabilities in the supply chain providing domestic firms a strong 
source of competitive advantage.  The result is a developmental story that is quite different 
from the conventional export-led model:  despite the intense competition within an open 
marketplace, domestic firms are able to build capabilities and move into higher value-added 
segments of the value chain. 
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1 See also Kennedy, S. (2005). China's Porous Protectionism:  The Changing Political Economy of Trade 
Policy. Political Science Quarterly 120(3), 407-432.. 
2 Since much of the technology transfer incurred in the context of JVs, in which SOEs were often 
partners, the bias favoured SOEs and worked against non-SOEs.  In numerous sectors, including several 
we look at, the hope was that the transfer of manufacturing and managerial knowhow would benefit the 
“independent” manufacturing operations of the SOE partner. 
3 Gereffi, in his analysis of the garment industry, sees a fairly steady progression from OEM to ODM to 
OBM.  He describes an iterative process:  the buyers work with suppliers in order to assure quality 
standards and gradually suppliers gain capabilities through a process of “learning-by-doing.”  As the 
suppliers improve their capabilities, buyers (who are usually under intense competitive pressure) are more 
than willing to transfer a broader range of activities to the supplier.  Martin Bell, in his analysis of the 
footwear industry, suggests that buyers are careful to limit the potential for their suppliers to engage in 
design, branding, and marketing because they do not want to create their own competitors.  Humphrey 
and Schmitz argue that the form of governance within the chain, and in particular the nature of the 
linkages between firms within the chain, is a key determinant of the type of knowledge that is transmitted 
between firms.   
4 The firm-level data are from the 1995 and 2004 Industrial Census, which provide detailed firm-level 
information for all manufacturing firms in China on key economic variables such as output, sales, 
exports, etc., as well as information on ownership  In 2004, for example, there were more than 1 million 
manufacturing firms. The trade data are at the 8-digit HS level, and have been aggregated to the 4-digit 
CIC level on the basis of a concordance we constructed between the two.  Thus, for each 4-digit CIC 
sector, we have information on:  1) Total manufacturing output, disaggregated between Chinese and 
foreign-invested enterprises; 2) total exports, disaggregated between Chinese firms and FIE; and, 3) total 
imports.  FIEs include both joint-ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
5 For example, starting from a very low base, the share of Chinese firms in the manufacture of leather 
shoes sold domestically rose from 11.6 to 75 percent.  Chinese bamboo and rattan furniture makers, 
which in 1995 already supplied 62.5 percent of the market, succeeded in raising their share to 86.1 
percent by 2004.   These successes can be contrasted with sectors such as copiers, vehicles, perfumes, and 
hydraulic turbines, in which Chinese firms have loss significant market share.   In these sectors, some 
combination of technology, manufacturing know-how, branding and marketing were more important.   
6 Quality refers primarily to product quality, measured in terms of reliability, durability, etc. but might 
also refer to quality of service (and in particular after sale service). Product sophistication is imprecise, 
but refers to the range of functions or the complexity of the technology in a product. 
7 At the 4-digit level, “vehicles” is made up of cars, buses and trucks, while CNC machine tools is 
included in “machine tools.”    
8 In terms of size, the vehicles sector was clearly the largest; the total value of domestic output in 1995 
was 107 billion RMB, or ten times the size of either of the other two sectors. One potential explanation 
for the differences is the tariff rates that were applied to these sectors in 1995.  For 1998, we constructed 
estimates of tariffs at the CIC level. For vehicles, the tariff was 62.l percent, compared to 14.2 in heavy 
construction and 14.6 in metal cutting machine tools. 
9 Between 2000 and 2005, for example, the average annual drop in car prices calculated at the car model 
level was 9 percent.  J.D. Power quality surveys indicate that cars produced by domestic firms continue to 
be far inferior to international levels, but much improved.  J.D. Power uses a metric called “PP100,” or 
problems per 100 vehicles.  In 2006, the average for domestic firms in China was 368.  This was far 
higher than the average for FIEs in China (189) or a U.S.-produced vehicle (124), but a significant 
improvement over the average for domestic firm’s in 2000 (834).  Lubo Li, “The Quality Drag on China’s 
Car Industry,” Business Week, June 29, 2007.    
10 This is largely a result of consumer preferences:  the consumers that demand the highest quality in 
China also tend to prefer larger, more luxurious cars.  In Europe, by contrast, small cars can be high or 
low quality.   
11 The data we draw on identify 8 market segments in China: Luxury, Executive, SUV, Minivan, Upper 
Medium, Lower Medium, Small and Mini.  Engine Displacement declines monotonically through the 
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group from a high of 2.6 to a low of 0.9. To simplify slightly, we collapse the top two (luxury and 
executive), and the bottom two (small and mini) into single segments. 
12 Wheel loaders and excavators can also be used to perform some of the same tasks. 
13 The wheel loader product segment can be segmented according to product size and then again by price.  
In 2007, nearly 60% of the market was for 5 ton wheel loaders, 30% was for the 3 ton, and 10% was for 
the 8 ton. In the case of the 5 ton product, which has been the most rapidly growing market segment since 
the late 1990s, critical price points are 270,000 RMB and above (premier products), 230-270,000 (mid-
range products), and below 230,000 (low-end products).  
14 We do not have an exact breakdown for these firms of sales between the domestic and overseas 
markets.  The 14.25 is calculated under the assumption that all of FIE’s sales were to the domestic 
market. 
15 In 2005, Caterpillar took a minority position in SEM, and then acquired the rest of it in 2007.   
16 We make a similar assumption here about exports of FIEs as we do for wheel loaders, and that all 
exports were by Chinese firms. 
17 This would include: 1. metal cutting machines, e.g. lathes; drilling, boring and milling machines; 
grinding machines; machining centers; 2. metal forming machines, e.g. forging or die-stamping machines; 
forming and bending machines; 3. wood-working machines; 4. cutting tools; and 5. the mfg of machine 
parts and components, including numerical control devices, accessories, etc.   
18 A lathe is a particular type of machine tool that spins a block of material to perform various operations 
such as cutting, sanding, drilling, etc. with tools that are applied to the work piece. In contrast, for a 
machining center, the piece of material remained fixed. 
19 Table A.1 in the Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown in the case of lathes. 
20 Multiple-spindle, multiple axis machines also allow machining to be done as part of an integrated 
process as opposed to a series of discrete steps, thus saving time and often contributing to higher 
precision.  
21 The fall in the percentage of CNC machines consumed domestically that were imported is actually even 
larger than suggested by the table.  The Asia Financial Crisis in 1997 had a significant impact on demand 
in the sector, and imports dropped sharply the next few years. In 1996, imports represented 60 percent of 
domestic consumption. 
22 In interpreting the rise in unit values as an indication of rising quality, it must be remembered that 
falling tariffs, expanded entry, and increasing competition, all should have been putting downward 
pressure on prices. 
23 At the most basic level, manufacturing capability refers to the process skills that are necessary to 
transform inputs into outputs and is distinct from design and engineering capabilities.  The processes that 
would be included in manufacturing capability include:  supply chain management, production 
scheduling, quality control, trouble shooting to overcome problems encountered in manufacturing, and 
the ability to adapt processes to changing circumstances (Amsden 2001).  A firm with basic 
manufacturing capabilities will be able to utilize a design to manufacture a basic product, and as process 
technologies are upgraded it will increase the productivity of its operations and the quality of the product 
produced.  Design and engineering capabilities refers to a firm’s ability to adapt and develop the design 
for new products.  A firm with no design capabilities will utilize externally-acquired designs (and quality 
will be determined by the extent of its manufacturing capabilities).  As the firm gains design and 
engineering skills it will have an increased capability to alter and adapt products.  A firm with a high level 
of design and engineering capabilities will have the ability to develop its own products.     
24  Our primary focus is on product change, and the product lifecycle varies widely between industries.  In 
the shoe industry, a particular style of shoe might remain popular for six months; in the semiconductor 
industry, the life of particular family of microprocessors will tend to stay in the market for two to four 
years; in the aircraft industry, an aircraft design can endure for three decades (Fine 1998).  Fine points to 
three types of change within an industry:  product, process, and organizational.  Fine, C. (1998). 
Clockspeeed:  Winning industry control in the age of temporary advantage. Reading, MA: Perseus 
Books. 
25 At the first tier, other kinds of intermediates such as the integrated circuits used in the numerical control 
systems, or metal alloys continue to be imported or sourced from foreign firms. 
26 One advantage of this is that it has helped these suppliers achieve economies in production, and thus 
likely lowered costs. 
27 GSK is interesting in its own right. Numerical controls were initially imported from companies such as 
Siemens and Fanuc. By the late 1980s, early 1990s, a number of Chinese firms, including GSK, 
developed their own systems.  Several of these firms left the market in the face of price wars with firms 
such as Siemens, but several have survived, and serve the low to low-middle end of the market.  GSK has 
also invested heavily in developing NC systems for universal CNC machines, and more complex 
machining centers. 
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28 For a discussion on the dynamics of entry, firm turnover, and market consolidation in China during this 
period, see Brandt, L., T. G. Rawski, et al. (2008). China's industrial development. China's Great 
Economic Transformation. L. Brandt and T. G. Rawski. New York, Cambridge University Press, 569-
632. 
29 This is not always the case.  It is common for foreign manufacturers of construction equipment, for 
instance, to use more labor-intensive production processes.  As one multinational firm explained, the 
designs for their products are “robust” enough that they can be produced using either automated 
techniques or more labor-intensive approaches.  The strategy of the firm is to use imported equipment 
only where it is absolutely essential to safety and performance.  Manual welding, for instance, was 
thought to produce “every bit as good” as results as were achieved by automated facilities in Japan.   “The 
economic formula in China is very different:  you don’t have to eliminate labour costs and the quality is 
equal (Interview 122107).” 
30 In many cases, OEM firms have pushed the responsibility for the design of components (and even 
entire modules) onto their global suppliers, and this makes “follow-sourcing” a necessity (Humphrey and 
Memedovic (2003). 
31 Foreign managers in the 1990s sometimes spoke of “veneer localization.” A Tier 1 supplier was located 
in China, and thus conformed to Chinese regulations, but relied extensively on imported components.  
Japanese and Korean auto firms entered China relatively late, and they relied heavily on localization 
strategies of this sort (Thun 2006:  238-241). 
32 “Volkswagen Group in China:  Automaker bolsters localization of key components in China,” Fourin 
China Auto Weekly, January 7, 2008, p. 3.  
33 “In China, exceeding customer expectations is wrong!” the manager of the global firm explained.  
“You meet customer expectations.  If you exceed customer expectations you will not be able to meet the 
price pressures (Interview 051807).”  Depending on the component being produced, it is sometimes 
possible for a domestic firm to lower costs by changing the manufacturing process without sacrificing 
quality.         
34 Interview 070805. 
35 In order to get around the obstacle of a premium segment, one foreign firm producer developed a “de-
featured” excavator in 1998-1999, but the feedback from consumers was that it looked “cheap” and the 
firm abandoned the effort.  Interview 122107. 
36 In the case of a foreign firm making braking systems, for example, design changes to the caliper 
reduced the complexity of the machining that was required, and thus the type of CNC machines that 
suppliers need to use.  This allowed the foreign firm to significantly increase local sourcing.     
37 Technology, patents, management processes, and trade secrets are common examples of firm specific 
advantages.  
38 Chery provides on example of this dynamic.  The QQ, the model that was the key to its rapid rise, is 
often used by foreign firms as an example of IPR violations.  A Chinese version of the story is that the 
key designer on the project, Ni Shaoyong, developed a mini-car at Dongfeng-Citroen, but was so 
frustrated by the limited power of a local designer to push a project within a JV structure that he moved 
with 14 colleagues to Chery’s home-base of Wuhu and started a design firm that worked under contract 
for Chery.  Liu Tao, “China’s Auto Design:  Paths and Dreams,” China Entrepreneur, 20 January 2007.  
39 At the same time, the global supplier will take care to prevent the domestic firm from acquiring core 
technologies and contracts will often specify the domestic firms from selling the component in particular 
markets.   
40 In future work, we will expand our analysis into sectors in which one or more of the above may have been missing. 
This will serve two purposes. First, it will help to confirm the role of the factors we identified. Second, it may help to 
see how government policy is trying to compensate. 
41 In fact, a domestic firm that is heavily utilizing foreign components will often pay a higher price than a 
foreign competitor because it is operating at lower volumes. 
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Total 
Domestic 
Sales
Domestic 
firms  
FIEs   Imports  
Year Trillion RMB % % %
1995 4.6 68.3 13.3 18.4
2004 18.7 59 21.8 19.1
 
Table 1: Domestic Market Shares
 
  1995 2004 Change
Low Base: 0‐25 0‐25
Mini‐motors 0 44.5 44.5
Leather shoes 11.6 75 63.4
Packing equip. 18.7 48.8 30.1
Sports balls 19.3 68.2 48.9
Industrial glass 24.4 54.6 30.2
Medium: 25‐50  
  Communication Switching Equip. 31.5 63.2 31.7
Cutlery 34.4 69.6 35.2
Irrigation Equipment 35.4 71.4 36
Compound Fertilizers 37.5 74.7 37.2
Plywood 38.5 84.3 45.8
Other ceramics 45.5 80.4 34.9
High: 50+  
Bamboo and rattan furniture 62.5 86.1 23.6
Leather luggage and handbags 47.3 65.6 18.3
Air conditioners 51.3 72.4 21.1
Household rubber pdts 60.1 82.5 22.4
Metal structures 66 83.7 17.7
 
 
Table 2: Sectors with Big Increases in Domestic Market Share
 
Low base: 0‐50   1995 2004 Change
 
Optical instruments 24.3 4 ‐20.3
Carbonated beverages 31.7 11.5 ‐20.2
Motion picture equipment 32.8 3 ‐29.8
Electric measuring instruments 35 10.5 ‐24.5
Vacuum tubes 37.4 14.8 ‐22.6
Copiers 47.2 7.3 ‐39.9
Medium: 50‐75  
Transmission Equipment 57.2 39.6 ‐17.6
Cosmetics 58.5 40.1 ‐18.4
Motor meters and instruments 59.3 41.8 ‐17.5
Industrial organic chemicals 61.2 41.9 ‐19.3
Vehicles 66.3 38.2 ‐28.1
Hydraulic equipment and parts 70.2 48.7 ‐21.5
High: 75 +  
Radar and radar parts 76.7 59.4 ‐17.3
Internal combustion engines and parts 80 52.1 ‐27.9
Smelting 95.3 57.3 ‐38
Electronic calculators 100 21 ‐79
Computer peripherals 100 7 ‐93
Hydraulic turbines 100 53.6 ‐46.4
Table 3: Sectors with Significant Reductions in Market Share
Market Share of FIEs  
Percentage 
of All 
Sectors
Illustrative Examples
Percent
0‐5 14.5
Chemical fertilizers; optical instruments; 
metallurgy equipment; lead and zinc smelting; 
irrigation equipment
5‐15 28.1
Spinning and weaving; machine tools; 
tractors; electric fans; transformers; printing 
equipment
15‐25 22.6
Metal furniture; air compressors; construction 
equipment; fibreboard; paper products; 
dyestuff; cement products; optical glass; 
aluminum products; min‐‐motors
25‐50 26.2
Apparel; motorcycles; electronic components; 
air conditioners; washing machines; metal 
packing materials and containers; glass for 
industrial construction
50+ 8.6
Vehicles; polyolefin plastics; communication 
terminal equipment; integrated circuits; 
television sets
Table  4:  Role of FIEs in China's Domestic Market
Total Domestic 
Sales
Domestic 
firms  
FIEs   Imports  
Billion RMB % % %
Year
Construction Equipment 1995 11.33 75.2 4.4 19.8
2004 59.71 63.5 20.8 15.8
Vehicles 1995 106.95 66.3 29.5 4.2
2004 526.60 38.2 57.5 4.3
Machine Tool 1995 10.45 40.0 1.5 58.5
2004 36.63 41.6 5.8 52.7
Table 5: Domestic Market Shares
          Year
Total Sales by 
Firms Mfg in 
China
Domestic 
Demand
Imports Exports
JV‐WOS % 
of 
Domestic 
Market
Imports % 
of 
Domestic 
Market
1997 17,404          15,704         1,164       2,863       7.41
1998 17,254          17,296         431          389          2.49
1999 18,819          18,991         438          266          2.31
2000 20,857          20,748         297          406          1.43
2001 26,352          26,076         217          493          0.83
2002 43,348          42,693         287          942          0.67
2003 69,666          69,723         441          384          0.63
2004 91,334          90,985         568          917          0.62
2005 107,354        103,620       396          4,130       0.38
2006 129,834        120,946       469          9,357       14.25 0.39
         Source : 1997‐2006:  Zhongguo gongcheng jixie gongye nianjian, 2007, pp. 10‐12.
Table 6: Wheel Loader Market in China
Firm Name Firm Type Total Sales 2006
Rank
1 Liugong Domestic 20,193
2 Longgong Domestic 20,016
3 Xiamen gongcheng jixie Domestic 16,734
4 Lingong Domestic 14,273
5 Xuzhou gongcheng jixie Domestic 9,222
6 Shandong shangong FIE 8,049
7 Chengdu shengang gongcheng jixie FIE 7,230
8 Changlin Domestic 6,374
9 Shandong futian zhonggong Domestic 5,159
10 Zhongguo yila jituan Domestic 4,385
All Firms 129,834
Of which:   Foreign 17,235
 
Note:  
1.  Total sales refers to both domestic and overseas.
2. Catepillar took a minority position in Shandong shangong in 2005, and then later acquired the rest.   
Table 7: Top 10 Wheel Loader Manufacturers in China, 2006
          Year
Total Sales 
by Firms 
Mfg in 
China
Domestic 
Demand
Imports Exports
JV‐WOS % 
of 
Domestic 
Market
Imports % 
of 
Domestic 
Market
1997 3293 9202 6623 714 71.97
1998 4238 8753 4728 213 54.02
1999 5988 7434 1602 156 21.55
2000 7926 9034 1333 225 14.76
2001 12397 13451 1624 50 12.07
2002 19710 22259 2886 337 12.97
2003 33982 61392 28200 790 45.93
2004 33614 48848 18673 2874 38.23
2005 33862 48040 18017 3839 37.50
2006 49625 70018 28397 8004 54.42 40.56  
          Source : 1997‐2006:  Zhongguo gongcheng jixie gongye nianjian, 2007, pp. 10‐12.
Table 8:  Excavator Market in China
Firm Name Firm Type Total Sales 2006
Rank
1 Sumitomo FIE 8,354
2 Komatsu FIE 6,891
3 Hitachi FIE 4,955
4 Cat FIE 4,477
5 Hyundai FIE 3,440
6 Hyundai FIE 3,155
7 Guangxi wanglin Domestic 3,426
8 Chengdu shengang Domestic 2,923
9 Shandong fulin Domestic 2,107
10 Zhongguo yila jituan Domestic 1,734
All Firms 49,625
Of which: Foreign 38,102
 
Table 9: Top 10 Excavator Manufacturers in China, 2006
1997 2000 2003 2006
Number of domestic producers NA NA 391                 451              
Employment NA 208,634       177,118         168,800      
PHYSICAL UNITS
  Production 186,500       176,598       306,848         562,134      
     of which CNC 9,051           14,053         36,813           85,756        
  Consumption 147,200       158,417       282,989         NA
     of which CNC 15,200         23,480         52,383           107,482      
 Imports 43,900         63,444         75,338           NA
     of which CNC 6,200           11,155         23,320           33,693        
 Exports 83,200         81,625         99,197           NA
     of which CNC 965               1,728           2,840             11,967        
VALUE TOTALS (US$ Billion)
  Sales of Domestic Producers 1.38 1.56 2.30 7.00
     of which CNC 0.22 0.49 0.74 2.74
% CNC 15.87 31.36 32.40 39.10
  Consumption 2.06 2.57 4.89 12.9
     of which CNC 0.74 1.27 2.87 7.00
% CNC 35.87 49.42 58.70 54.26
  Imports 0.91 1.25 2.91 5.48
     of which CNC 0.54 0.81 2.18 4.47
% CNC 59.76 65.00 74.97 81.57
  Exports 0.23 0.25 0.32 1.16
     of which CNC 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.28
% CNC 9.69 13.88 17.30 23.79
Import Share in Absorption by Value (%)  44.03 48.73 59.47 42.48
Import Share in CNC Absorption by Value  73.34 64.09 75.95 63.86
Import Share in CNC Absorption by Quantity 40.79 47.51 44.52 31.35
Unit Value CNC Imports ($US) 87,419         72,972         93,396           132,669      
Unit Value CNC Exports ($US) 22,798         19,676         19,366           23,063        
Unit Value of CNC domestic sales by domestic producers 24,363         36,998         20,297           33,352        
Ratio of unit values Import:Export 3.8 3.7 4.8 5.8
Ratio of unit values of Import: Domestic Sales 3.6 2.0 4.6 4.0
Sources: Machine Tool Yearbook,  various years
Table 10: Production, Consumption, Trade and Pricing of Metal Cutting Machine tools, 1997‐2006
 
Quantity % imported Value (Billion $US) % imported Average Price
Type Total Imported Domestic Total Imported Domestic Imported Domestic  Ratio
Vertical 11625 8133 3492 0.70 0.823 0.637 0.186 0.77 78,323 53,265 1.47
Horizontal 1950 1326 624 0.68 0.544 0.460 0.084 0.85 346,908 134,615 2.58
Plano 600 295 305 0.49 0.215 0.123 0.092 0.57 416,949 301,639 1.38
Other 825 589 236 0.71 0.088 0.078 0.010 0.89 132,428 42,373 3.13
Total 15000 10343 4657 0.69 1.67 1.298 0.372 0.78 125,496 79,880
Table 11: Domestic Consumption of Machining Centers, 2005
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    Figure 3:  Market Segments in the Construction Equipment Sector 
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            Source: China Machine Tool Yearbook, 2006.
 
  
         
                         Figure 7:  Sourcing by Auto OEMs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
Source:  Firm Interviews, 2006 and 2007. 
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Appendix: Taxonomy of Lathes 
 
Economical lathes: Single axis, 4-tool vertical turret and flat horizontal bed configuration.  
Compared with the conventional non-CNC lathes, the economical lathes provide better 
machining precision, usability and efficiency. Shortcomings include the small number of tools 
on the turret, positioning accuracy, and the fact that spindle speed cannot be changed 
automatically. (Price is ~ typically between $US 12-15,000) 
Universal type lathes: More technologically advanced than the economical lathes in a 
number of dimensions including turning ability, the properties of key functional components, 
and the NC system. In contrast to the single axis economical lathes, the universal lathe has 2 
axes. They come in both horizontal and vertical models.  (Price is ~ $US 50,000) 
CNC Turning Centers: More complex than the universal lathe because it can achieve 3-axis 
or more simultaneous machining. It also carries out the turning operations with higher 
accuracy and faster cycle time. There are a number of different types of turning centers 
including horizontal turning centers, vertical turning centers, and modular turning centers.  
The trend in design has also been to develop centers with twin turrets and spindles. The 
advantage of two spindles (the second spindle is referred to as the sub-spindle) is that it 
allows secondary operations to be performed without operator intervention.  The sub-spindle 
allows machining on both sides of the part in one operation, thereby improving concentricity, 
cutting set-up time, and labor costs for loading-unloading of the part.  (Price is in upwards of 
$US 150,000). 
CNC Turning/Milling Centers: Most complex of the CNC lathes because it combines a 
lathe with a machining center in order to harness the turning ability of the lathe and the 
milling ability of a machining center. Compared to a CNC turning center, the turning/milling 
center has an additional C-axis.  The highest configuration of the CNC turning/milling 
machine has 5 axis, which allows for simultaneous machining on the X Y Z C and B axis. 
(Price in upwards of $US 500,000) 
